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Abstract We present a general dynamic model of within-season harvesting com-
petition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-perfect 
equilibrium (MPE) harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using 
numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-
value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition, and stock 
uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological, and market conditions 
under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota pro-
gram are fairly special. We offer new insights for designing rights-based programs 
capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries. 
Key words   Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, individual transferable quotas, pro-
duction externalities, resource rent. 
JEL Classification Code   Q2.
Introduction
Growing evidence finds that property rights-based management approaches, such as in-
dividual transferable quotas (ITQs), offer important advantages over traditional fisheries 
management, which has relied on input controls to prevent overfishing; e.g., vessel entry 
limits, gear restrictions, and time and area closures (Committee to Review Individual 
Fishing Quotas 1999; Grafton et al. 2006; Costello, Gaines, and Lynham 2008). Rights-
based approaches better align the incentives of individual resource users with those of 
managers and can eliminate common-pool inefficiencies which otherwise plague fishery 
resources. Some authors point out, however, that conditions may exist under which ITQs 
do not fully correct all externalities, and therefore do not generate first-best economic 
outcomes.1 These conditions, hereafter unattended production externalities, include a 
heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, and situations where 
fishermen must gather information about the true location of fish. With a standard ITQ 
design, resource users are granted rights to harvest a portion of a common fish stock dur-
ing a set production period. If the stock is heterogeneous-in-value, an inefficient race 
to fish can ensue as fishermen attempt to harvest the highest-valued units before rivals 
(Boyce 1992, 2001; Costello and Deacon 2007). It has been argued that a single quota 
trading price cannot reflect both the shadow price of the harvest constraint and the price 
of congestion on the fishing ground; therefore, congestion externalities can continue to 
Adriana Valcu is a Ph.d. candidate and Quinn Weninger is an associate professor, department of Economics, 
Iowa State University, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011–1070 USA (email: amvalcu@iastate.edu and weninger@
iastate.edu, respectively). Please send all correspondence to weninger@iastate.edu, phone: (515) 294–8976. 
 The authors are grateful for comments and feedback from Rajesh Singh, Harvey lapan, participants at the 
2010 AERE summer conference, and members of the department of Applied Economics at the University of 
Minnesota. We also thank two anonymous referees and the journal editor for helpful comments and suggestions.
1 Clark 1980a; Boyce 1992, 2001; Holland 2004; Bisack and Sutinen 2006; Cancino, Uchida, and Wilen 2007; 
Costello and Deacon 2007; Deacon, Parker, and Costello 2008; Fell 2010.
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dissipate economic rent in ITQ fisheries (Boyce 1992, 2001; see Danielsson 2000 for an 
opposing view). lastly, Costello and deacon (2007) suggest rent dissipation can arise in 
decentralized ITQ fisheries if fishermen engage in redundant, costly searches for informa-
tion. The authors recommend granting enhanced or “fully delineated” property rights to 
fishery resources to correct the problems and restore first-best economic outcomes.
 While considerable progress has been made in understanding the role of unattended 
production externalities in ITQ fisheries, several unresolved questions remain. What fac-
tors cause heterogeneity in stock value, and do all lead to rent dissipation? How important 
are congestion effects? To what extent will a well-functioning quota trading market offset 
the ill-effects of unattended production externalities? What design features should be ad-
opted to restore full economic rents in ITQ-managed fisheries?
 An obstacle to answering these and other questions is the complex—strategic, dy-
namic, and stochastic—setting in which unattended production externalities reside. 
Game-theoretic models and solution concepts are required for predicting fishing behavior 
and market outcomes. Unfortunately, dynamic games of common pool resource extraction 
are difficult to solve analytically. As a consequence, most previous research has relied on 
heuristic arguments to obtain results, or have studied restrictive models to understand rent 
dissipation due to unattended production externalities (Fell (2010) is an exception).
 We use numerical methods to solve for Markov-perfect Nash (closed-loop) equilibria 
to a general model of a dynamic, within-season fishing game that nests models of Clark 
(1980a), Boyce (1992), and others who have espoused the problem of unattended exter-
nalities in ITQ fisheries. Our approach allows direct observation of harvest patterns, quota 
trading outcomes, and rent loss over a range of biological and market conditions. As such, 
we are able to provide a fairly complete picture of the precise biological, technological, 
and market factors that cause rent loss in ITQ-managed fisheries. The insights are impor-
tant for improving the design of quota management programs in fisheries.
 Our results confirm early insights by Clark (1980a), Boyce (1992), and others, who 
suggest ITQs will not fully remove the incentives to race to fish. We show, however, that 
the incentive to race and the accompanying rent losses arise under fairly special structural 
properties for the harvest technology and stock conditions. We show how the extent of 
rent loss depends on the cost-stock elasticity and economies of harvest size. Both must 
be large for significant rent losses to persist. Additional results show that rents are not 
dissipated due to congestion effects alone, a result argued in danielsson (2000) and later 
questioned in Boyce (2001). We also show that marketing competition in the presence of 
finitely elastic fish demand does not alone cause rent dissipation in ITQ fisheries. In fact, 
finitely elastic demand for fish provides incentives to smooth the harvest throughout the 
fishing season and effectively counters the incentive to race to fish.
 We present a policy simulation to identify the impacts of modifying standard ITQ de-
signs, toward fully delineated property rights, as has been suggested in the literature. Our 
simulation shows the potential downside of delineating harvest rights temporally; i.e., 
restricting the calendar period during which the harvest right can be used to manage tem-
poral competition among fishermen. We find that such restrictions can reduce total rents if 
they limit the ability of fishermen to respond to unanticipated productivity shocks.
 Our results provide guidance for managers who must decide, based on measurable 
characteristics of a fishery, when rent dissipation is likely to persist and when modifica-
tion/enhancement of the harvest right is warranted. We show that it may be difficult to 
identify rent dissipation due to unattended production externalities in practice. This is due 
to the finding that accelerated harvests early in the fishing season are not evidence of rent 
dissipation. Accelerated harvest can be an optimal response to structural properties of the 
harvest technology or capital opportunity costs. We therefore caution against ITQ rule 
modification until key elements; e.g., the cost-stock elasticity parameter and the cost elas-
ticity of size are measured and deemed empirically important.
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 Our article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on unat-
tended production externalities in rights-based fisheries. We then present our model and 
describe the numerical methods used to solve for a Markov-Nash equilibrium of our 
within-season fishing game. Results are presented next. The last section summarizes our 
findings and discusses implications for improving the design of rights-based fisheries 
management programs.
Externalities in ITQ Fisheries
Christy (1973) and Maloney and Pearse (1979) propose using quantitative fishing rights 
to address common-pool inefficiencies in commercially exploited marine fisheries. 
Rights-based approaches are currently used throughout the world. Mounting empirical 
evidence suggests that rights-based approaches offer important advantages over tradi-
tional management, which relies on input controls to conserve fish stocks (Grafton et al. 
2006; Costello, Gaines, and Lynham 2008).2 
 Clark (1980a) characterizes the performance of alternative management instruments, 
effort restrictions, taxes, and aggregate and individual vessel quotas in replicating socially 
optimal (economically efficient) harvesting behavior and economic rent in a decentralized 
fishery. In his analysis of ITQs, Clark (1980a) presents a seasonal model, and to simplify 
the analytical presentation, assumes no natural stock growth occurs while harvesting op-
erations are underway. Under a fixed total quota and with no natural stock growth, the 
stock size necessarily declines during the fishing season, from its initial size to the end-
of-season escapement level, which by assumption is equal to the initial stock size less 
the harvested quota. As is standard in the resource economics literature, Clark (1980a) 
assumes the harvest technology exhibits a stock effect, where the productivity of fishing 
effort is greater when the stock size is large. One implication of his model is that as the 
total quota is extracted and the stock size declines, the net profit per unit of harvest, also 
the residual profit per unit of quota, declines. Clark (1980a, p. 1124) correctly observes 
that a fisherman operating under an ITQ regulation can lower the cost of harvesting a 
fixed quota allocation “by concentrating his catch at the early part of the season when the 
stock level is high.” He also points out that, “This situation is suboptimal for the fishery 
as a whole, since vessel's catches have an external influence on all vessels subsequent 
catch rates.” Clark discusses briefly an extension to the case of congestion externalities 
and concludes that ITQs do not replicate first-best outcomes in the presence of stock and 
congestion effects. Clark does not rigorously derive his results regarding the implications 
of externalities and notes that to do so would require solving an N-player differential 
game. He leaves this challenging exercise for future research (see also Clark 1980b).
 Boyce (1992) revisits the issue of unattended production externalities in ITQ fisher-
ies. He introduces the N player differential game that Clark (1980a) alluded to. In the 
Boyce (1992) model, autonomous agents simultaneously choose effort rates and quota 
purchases with the goal of maximizing individual single season fishing profits. As in 
Clark (1980a), Boyce features a declining within-season stock and unit profits which 
result from the assumption that no-natural growth occurred during the fishing season. 
Boyce (1992) also assumes a congestion externality that operates through a primal pro-
duction function. He assumes the harvest of a representative fisherman increases with 
the fisherman’s own effort allocation and the size of the fish stock, but decreases with 
the effort allocations of other fishermen. The model features both stock and congestion 
externalities. Boyce also does not derive the Nash equilibrium of the differential game in 
his paper, but derives results by comparing necessary conditions for the optimal and equi-
2 Copes (1986), and more recently Pinkerton and Edwards (2009), provide critiques of rights-based management 
approaches in fisheries.
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librium play of the game. Boyce (1992) concludes that the equilibrium trading price of 
quota will not reflect differences in the value of a heterogeneous fish stock and that ITQ 
management will not replicate socially optimal harvesting behavior or rent in the pres-
ence of stock and/or congestion externalities (see Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, p. 399).
 Danielsson (2000) challenges Boyce’s (1992) claim that congestion externalities 
alone preclude socially optimal outcomes in an ITQ fishery. Danielsson’s (2000) article 
suggests that Clark (1980) and Boyce (1992) do not correctly incorporate the quota con-
straint and a well-functioning quota market in the analysis of fishing behavior. Danielsson 
(2000) presents his arguments in a continuous time model, which does not reflect stock 
externalities caused by a declining (heterogeneous) fish stock. Boyce (2001) offers a 
response to the danielsson (2000) critique, reiterating his earlier claim that congestion 
externalities alone were, in fact, enough to cause a divergence between socially optimal 
and ITQ outcomes.
 Costello and deacon (2007) argue that rent dissipation, due to unattended externali-
ties in ITQ fisheries, may be common in real world fisheries. The authors find that “even 
with homogeneous fishermen, no stock externalities and no congestion externalities, 
property rights assigned to harvest (ITQs) may not secure all rents in a fishery.”3 Rents 
are dissipated as competing fishermen race to the higher valued sub-stock earlier than 
the optimal date. Costello and deacon (2007) consider a new avenue for rent dissipa-
tion in ITQ fisheries, which is uncertainty over the true spatial location of the fish stock. 
The authors characterize the gains from coordinating search efforts among fishermen and 
show that such efforts can avoid redundant searches that occur under decentralized ITQ 
management. The authors call for a more refined assignment of property rights to correct 
the inefficiencies identified in their model.
 Fell (2010) studies within-season fishing behavior in the presence of stock effects, 
exogenously driven time-dependent harvesting costs, and ex-vessel fish prices that de-
pend on aggregate harvest rates. Fell (2010) is the first to consider a price competition 
externality; i.e., fishermen in the model have an incentive to slow their individual harvest 
rates to avoid market gluts and low fish prices. The externality occurs because the benefits 
of higher prices flow to all fishermen. A second innovation is that Fell (2010) numerically 
derives the Nash equilibrium to a within-season fishing game. Fell (2010) uses a genetic 
algorithm to identify a symmetric, open-loop Nash equilibrium to the N-player differen-
tial game. He finds that rent dissipation persists under an ITQ management program due 
to the simultaneous presence of stock effects and an inelastic demand for fish. Fishermen 
who would otherwise prefer to slow harvest and maintain high dockside prices have in-
centive to harvest early when stock size is largest and harvesting costs are lowest.
 Bisack and Sutinen (2006) report empirical estimates of rent loss due to unattended 
production externalities in the New Zealand scallop fishery. The authors compare a total 
cost minimizing harvest plan with a solution to a within-season harvest game that is de-
rived numerically. The authors estimate that unattended production externalities caused 
losses in the range of 9.6% and 20.2% in the 1996–97 fishing seasons, respectively.4
 Recent empirical work by Huang and Smith (2010) measures the impacts of stock 
and congestion externalities in a North Carolina shrimp fishery, which is managed under 
open access. The authors find that shrimp fishermen dissipate rents, by an estimated 17% 
3 Costello and Deacon (2007) present a model in which fishermen compete to harvest a fixed number of stock 
units, or sub-stocks. Sub-stock values vary exogenously throughout a fishing season, with each sub-stock having 
its own optimal and unique harvest date. Harvesting a sub-stock before or after the unique optimal date results 
in lost value. The model is static; fishermen simultaneously announce the date they plan to visit and the amount 
of quota dedicated to each sub-stock. The authors solve for the Nash equilibrium of a special case where the 
value of a sub-stock falls to zero for any fishermen arriving after some other fisherman has visited the sub-stock, 
and fishermen allocate their full quota to a single sub-stock.
4 The authors caution that their estimates are likely influenced by data limitations. It is also not clear how the 
authors derive Nash equilibrium harvesting outcomes in their simulations of fishing behavior.
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of annual fishery revenue, by harvesting shrimp too early in the fishing season; the value 
of stock would increase if left to grow during the season. Huang and Smith (2010) suggest 
temporally delineated effort controls could be used to dampen the race to fish and generate 
economic rent. Whether similar outcomes could be achieved under ITQ management, and 
whether similar gains might be expected in other fisheries, remains an open question.
 Results from the above literature impact the analysis that follows. First, there is un-
resolved debate as to which factors can cause rent dissipation, the magnitude of losses, 
and the policy prescriptions for restoring economic rent in ITQ fisheries. The question 
of whether congestion externalities alone are sufficient to cause rent dissipation under 
ITQs is an example (Danielsson 2000; Boyce 2001). Second, with the exception of Fell 
(2010), past researchers have relied on heuristic arguments and/or simplified models of 
behavior in an ITQ fishery to characterize the impacts of unattended externalities. The 
reason is that analytical solutions to general N-player differential games, in the presence 
of multiple externalities, are unavailable. The sections that follow introduce a general 
within-season model of an ITQ fishery and use numerical collocation methods to derive 
Markov-perfect (closed-loop) Nash equilibrium harvest patterns and rent outcomes. We 
are aware of the tradeoffs inherent in our numerical approach, but contend that i) the add-
ed insights from directly observing equilibrium play in a general, dynamic setting, and ii)
the lack of analytical alternatives warrants their use.5 We describe the solution algorithm 
and report results from a sensitivity analysis in an appendix.6 Additional details for the 
use of numerical methods in dynamic games can be found in Miranda and Fackler (2002), 
Judd (1998), and Vedenov and Miranda (2001).
 It is instructive to briefly review the role of time in the model and analysis that fol-
lows. Much of the analysis of unattended production externalities in ITQ fisheries is 
conducted in continuous time. We choose a discrete time model for two reasons. First, 
neo-classical production theory and concepts related to inefficiency are well developed 
and best understood in a discrete (fixed) time production model (Luenberger 1995). Sec-
ond, strategic harvesting behavior in continuous time must be modeled as a differential 
game. Solutions to Markov (closed-loop) differential games are often difficult to obtain 
even with numerical methods (dockner et al. 2000). The discrete time framework is less 
suited to examination of growth processes in marine fisheries. However, this shortcoming 
is addressed with simplifying assumptions that do not discredit our main results.
Model
We consider a single-stock fishery. The fishery manager issues permits to harvest a speci-
fied portion of the stock during a single, fixed length calendar period; hereafter, a fishing 
season. The fishing season is divided into t = 1,...,T equal length production periods.
 The aggregate seasonal quota is denoted y, and is delineated in the same units as the 
stock and harvest. The determination of the optimal harvest level is a central focus of the 
fisheries management literature. We do not consider these factors here; y is exogenous. 
Our measure of economic performance is the net profit from harvesting y from the sea.
 There are N > 1 fishermen, each operating a single fishing vessel. We assume each 
fisherman acts independently and non-cooperatively in pursuit of their own private profit 
objective. We rule out the possibility of a single fisherman purchasing the entire quota 
and internalizing all externalities. We do not necessarily agree with this characterization 
of fishing behavior in ITQ fisheries, but maintain the assumption to be consistent with 
previous literature. The assumption is revisited in the concluding section.
5 Judd (1998) discusses the use of numerical methods for analyzing economic problems.
6 Appendices are available at: <http://marineresourceeconomics.com/> or from Weninger upon request.
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 The size of the fish stock at the beginning of period t is denoted xt. We simplify our 
model and assume no growth, reproduction, or mortality occurs while harvesting opera-
tions are underway. We use hi,t to denote the harvest of fisherman i in period t. Total harvest 
in the period is ,1 ,
N
t i ti
h h
=
=∑  and period t escapement is st = xt – ht. In all periods and for all 
fishermen, harvest cannot exceed quota holdings. We use yi,t to denote the quantity of un-
fished quota held by fisherman i in period t; the quota regulation implies hi,t  ≤ yi,t, ∀i,t. There 
is no cheating in our model. The quota transition equation for fisherman i is given as: 
yi,t+1 = yi,t – hi,t, t = 1,2,...,T – 1.                                            (1)
  
The initial quota allocation, yi,1 for fisherman i, is determined in a pre-season market, 
which we describe shortly. Unfished quota is valueless following the season. Note that 
mid-season quota adjustments are considered in the stochastic version of the model; mid-
season quota adjustment is not relevant for the deterministic case since all harvests along 
the equilibrium path are known by rational agents. The maximum number of production 
periods is fixed at T. However, fishermen choose the number of periods in which they are 
active; i.e., periods in which harvests are positive. For example, a fisherman may choose 
to cease fishing mid-season, in period t' < T, in which case harvest hi,t = 0 ∀ t > t'. 
 The within-season evolution of the fish stock, in the general case, is governed by a 
stochastic logistic growth function: 
1 1 1 1 ,  1,2..., 1,tt t t
sx s r t T
k
[ 
ª º§ ·    ¨ ¸« »© ¹¬ ¼
                             (2)
  
with the initial stock size, x1, given. In the above expression r is the intrinsic growth pa-
rameter, k denotes carrying capacity, and 1 ,t[ [ [ ª º¬ ¼  where 0 t[ [ [ d d  f   is a 
random shock unobservable in period t.
 Harvesting cost for fisherman i in period t takes the general form: 
ci (hi,t, h–i,t,xt,Nt, t),
 
where h–i,t = ∑j≠i hj,t is the period t harvest of all fishermen other than i. Costs are assumed 
to be strictly increasing and convex in a fisherman’s own harvest, and non-increasing in 
the stock size. Costs may vary exogenously throughout the season, for example, if stocks 
become more or less concentrated over time (e.g., Costello and deacon 2007). The larger 
the total harvest in the period, the smaller the average stock size during the period, and 
therefore, the higher are harvesting costs for all fisherman. This is the source of the stock 
externality in our model. Following Smith (1968), we assume congestion externalities 
arise as vessels interfere with each others' harvesting operations on the fishing ground; 
ci(.) is assumed to be non-decreasing in N for N > 1.
 Lastly, the price of fish in period t is a non-increasing function of the period’s aggre-
gate harvest, ht. We also allow the price to vary exogenously across periods to reflect the 
possibility of market-driven external changes in stock value (Costello and deacon 2007). 
The inverse demand for harvested fish is denoted pt(ht).
 The goal of each fisherman is to maximize seasonal expected profits (there is no dis-
counting). Seasonal operating profits, net of quota purchase costs, are given as: 
, ,1
[ ( ) ( , , )],T t t i t i it i t t ttE p h h c h h x N t ¦                                   (3)
where E denotes expectations.
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Functional Forms
Implementing our numerical algorithm requires that we specify functional forms for the 
costs and inverse demand functions. We specify the harvest cost function as (period sub-
scripts are omitted):
      
1( , , , , ) ( ) ( 0.5( )) ,i i i i ic h h x N t N h x h h
K ED                              (4)
where η ≥ 1 and β ≥ 0. The parameter, β, measures the percentage change in harvest cost 
due to a percentage change in the midpoint of the period’s common stock size. The pa-
rameter αi(N) > 0 takes the form:
αi(N) = α + γ∑–i I(h–i > 0),                                                (5)
where γ ≥ 0, and ∑–i I(h–i > 0) is an indicator function set equal to the number of rival fish-
ermen with strictly positive harvest during the period. When γ > 0, harvest costs increase 
with the number of fishermen present on the fishing ground.
 Alternate parameterizations in equation (4) allow us to capture a range of structural 
properties for the harvest technology. Setting β = 0 turns off the stock effect, and setting 
γ = 0 shuts down the congestion effect. If η > 1, the technology exhibits per-period dimin-
ishing returns to harvest size.
 To be consistent with empirical observation of vessel-level harvesting technology, 
and a finite equilibrium ITQ fleet structure, as we discuss shortly, we require a harvest 
technology that exhibits variable returns to size at the seasonal level. Unless otherwise 
noted, we assume fishermen incur a strictly positive fixed cost if they are active, where 
active implies they hold positive quota and have positive harvests during the fishing sea-
son. The seasonal cost plays a limited role in the analysis below, and therefore no new 
notation is introduced.
 The inverse demand for fish follows: 
( ) .t t t tp h p hZ   
Exogenous demand shocks and changes in harvesting costs are considered by allowing 
parameters; e.g., stock effect parameter β and the inverse demand choke price p  t, to vary 
across periods. Unless otherwise stated, a quadratic in-harvest cost function (η = 2) is as-
sumed. Much of the analysis below considers a constant fish price; pt = p  . Hereafter, we 
set k = 1 to normalize the stock size on the interval [0,1]. 
 Our general model nests previous models and is able to isolate the various exter-
nalities that have appeared in earlier literature. deterministic stock transitions (Bisack 
and Sutinen 2006) arise under a degenerate shock distribution with Prob(ξt = 1) = 1, ∀t. 
Declining stock size (Clark 1980a; Boyce 1992, 2001; Fell 2010), and thus a heteroge-
neous-in-value stock (assuming stock effects are present) is obtained by setting r = 0. The 
corresponding stock transition equation becomes, 1 , .
N
t t t i ti
x s x h   ¦   Our specifica-
tion for the inverse fish demand captures marketing competition (Fell 2010). Exogenous 
changes in harvesting costs or harvest value are easily considered by allowing parameters 
of the cost and demand functions to vary throughout the fishing season (Costello and 
deacon 2007). We are able isolate stock and congestion externalities through parametric 
restrictions and examine the role of alternate structural assumptions for the harvest tech-
nology; e.g., varying returns to size. lastly, our numerical methods do not require that we 
impose symmetric equilibria or strictly positive harvests in each period. With zero harvest 
allowed, the length of the harvest period is endogenous in the model as in Fell (2010) but 
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can be different for each fisherman. The results below indicate that the generality and 
flexibility in the model are important.
Dynamic Fishing Game
At the beginning of each period, fishermen simultaneously choose quota-constrained har-
vest quantities. Each fisherman has full knowledge of the current period stock size and the 
quota holdings of other fishermen. In the case of stochastic stock transitions, the current 
period shock is known, but future shocks are unobserved and follow a known distribu-
tion. The state variables in the game include the current period stock size, a fisherman's 
own quota holding, the quota holdings of rival fishermen, and the harvesting period.
 We focus on pure strategy Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE), which exhibits the 
properties of dynamic consistency and subgame perfection. We therefore emphasize stra-
tegic interaction between fishermen through the evolution of state variables. Open-loop 
equilibria, or path strategies, which specify harvests as functions of time alone are not 
suited for analysis of stochastic stock evolution, which is an important characteristic of 
fisheries and a key component of our model.7 
 let yt = (y1,t,..., yN,t) denote the vector of unfished quota at the beginning of period t. 
We seek a seasonal, expected net profit maximizing harvest strategy that maps the N + 
2–dimension state vector (xt, yt, t) to a harvest quantity. The equilibrium harvest policy 
function prescribes, for each fisherman and every feasible state, a best harvest response 
to the harvest choices of rival fishermen. Analytical solutions to the MPE harvest policy 
are not available. The algorithm used to numerically solve for value functions and MPE 
strategies is described in Appendix A.
 The final step in defining equilibrium play is to specify the initial values of the 
state vector. The starting period and initial size of the fish stock are given exogenously. 
We will assume that the initial quota holdings for each fisherman are determined as the 
outcome of pre-season quota trading. The value of the initial quota allocation yi,1 for 
fisherman i is given as:
, ,
1 1 , ,1( | )
( , ,1) max [ ( ) ( , , , )],
i t i t
T
i t t i t i it i t t tth h
V x y E p h h c h h x N

 
 ¦                   (6)
  
subject to the quota constraint and state transition equations (1) and (2). The equilibrium 
outcome of the pre-season quota trading market is then given as: 
,1
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1arg max( ( , ,1) ( , ,1) ( , ,1)).
N
ii
ne
N
y y
y V x y V x y V x y
 
      
¦
                  (7)
 
Additional Considerations
Technology
Agents in our model operate a single fishing vessel. Clark (1980a) recognized that a 
variable returns technology was necessary for a meaningful discussion of equilibrium 
fleet size in an ITQ fishery. If the technology exhibits increasing returns over the range 
7 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a discussion of open-loop, closed-loop and Markov strategies in dynamic 
games (p. 501). Reinganum and Stokey (1985) study the role of commitment and discuss alternate equilibrium 
concepts in the context of common property resource games.
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of harvest [0,y], the equilibrium fleet size will be made up of a single fisherman/vessel. 
With a single fisherman there can be no externality and therefore no rent dissipation under 
decentralized ITQ management. On the other hand, if the harvest technology exhibits de-
creasing returns over the range [0,y], adding one more vessel to the fleet will always lower 
average costs and increase the RHS of equation (7).8 In this case, the equilibrium fleet size 
will include the entire population of vessels. To ensure a finite fleet size, the analysis that 
follows will focus attention on a variable returns technology at the seasonal level.
Equilibrium Fleet Structure
The expressions in equations (6) and (7) can be used to identify the equilibrium fleet 
structure in the ITQ fishery, along with the equilibrium quota price. Divide the population 
of fishermen into those who are active (holders of positive quota) in the ITQ equilibrium, 
as defined in equation (7), and inactive fishermen (fishermen with zero quota). Denote the 
subset of active fishermen in the population as A. The maximum that an inactive fisher-
man can pay to enter the fishery is 1 1( , ,1), ,jV x y j N  A,where the notation 1y   emphasizes 
that the initial quota allocation has changed to accommodate the additional participant. 
Entry can occur only if entrant j can profitably purchase quota from incumbents. This 
requires a gain from trade, which contradicts the original definition of 1 .
ney   Similarly, an 
incumbent can profitably exit the ITQ fishery only if some quota buyer is willing to pay 
to hold the quota. Buyers may include other incumbents or non-active fishermen. In either 
case, a gain from trade is required which again contradicts the definition of 1 .
ney  
Quota Price
The shadow price of quota is determined by its value in the hands of other incumbents or 
inactive fishermen. Holding the number of participants fixed, the marginal value of addi-
tional quota to an incumbent is calculated as: 
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The above expression emphasizes the fact that in the presence of a quota constraint and 
production externalities that operate through harvest choices, the value of quota for fish-
erman i is affected by the MPE harvest choices of all fishermen, which are functions of 
the state vector, including the initial quota allocation y1. The requirement that the sum of 
quota adjustments across active firms be equal to zero highlights a crucial feature of quo-
ta-managed fisheries. When the quota constraint binds, the quota held by fishermen i can 
increase only if the quota held by rival fishermen is reduced by the same amount. This 
feature is crucial for understanding the effects of unattended externalities in ITQ fisheries, 
as recognized by danielsson (2000).
 Expression (8) assumes the set of active fishermen is unchanged when quota is real-
located. This is a reasonable assumption for small quota changes. What is the value of 
quota to potential entrants? Under a variable returns technology, an entrant must acquire 
8 The optimal fleet size would be finite in the presence of congestion effects.
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enough quota to exploit available economies of size. Moreover, because the aggregate 
quota constraint must hold, ,1jj y y ¦   
 
 may be significantly different than 1 .
NEy  
Rent dissipation
Rent loss in a decentralized ITQ fishery requires an externality and also a mechanism by 
which harvesting inefficiency occurs. The structure of the harvest technology provides 
this mechanism. The term “race to fish” is a euphemism for accelerated and costly har-
vest behavior. In the context of our model, accelerated per-period harvest will raise costs 
under a strictly convex cost function; i.e., a decreasing returns to size technology. Under 
decreasing returns, higher per-period harvest implies increased marginal cost above the 
level that would be incurred at a slower harvest pace. To see why this property is crucial, 
consider the opposite case where the cost per unit of harvest is independent of harvest 
size. An example is c(h, x) = c(x)h, where c(x) is a decreasing function of stock size x, 
and h is quantity harvested (see Clark 1990; Reed 1979). With constant returns to size, an 
increase in h raises unit cost only through its effect on stock size. Racing for fish does not 
raise costs above the minimum feasible cost. Therefore, we consider decreasing or vari-
able returns to size at the level of a production period and maintain the variable returns at 
the seasonal level, due to the presence of seasonal fixed costs, as required for a positive 
but finite equilibrium fleet size.
Number of Players
A strength of the collocation method is its ability to accommodate a high-dimension state 
space. Solving the fishing game with N large is computationally demanding and yields few in-
sights beyond those obtained under a smaller value of N. We report results for N = 2 and N = 
3.9 The number of periods is set to T = 4. While the number of periods can be easily increased, 
our preliminary analysis found that four periods were enough to illustrate the temporal forces 
operational in the dynamic fishing game, allowing us to report results in less space.
Initial Conditions
For the results that follow, we set the beginning season stock size at x1 = k/2, and the sea-
sonal quota at y = 0.2. The collocation method approximates value functions and MPE 
harvest policy functions for any feasible state. We report results for the Nash equilibrium 
initial quota allocations as derived in equation (7).
Results
Collocation methods provide a high-order polynomial approximation to an unknown val-
ue function. Our investigation reveals that the approximation is extremely accurate. The 
average approximation error in the terminal period value function is 0.46%. The L∞ norm 
(maximum % error) is 1.87%. The largest percentage errors occur at small quota values, 
which tend not to be observed in equilibrium. Therefore we are fairly confident that ap-
proximation error does not significantly impact our results. Nonetheless, the results that 
follow should be interpreted accordingly.
9 The number of active fisherman we consider is clearly smaller than would be observed in an actual fishery. Our 
results illustrate qualitative strategic interactions only.
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 Figure 1 presents the per-period value functions, net of quota purchase costs, for rep-
resentative fisherman 1 under the assumptions of two active fishermen, no-within season 
stock growth, and no congestion effects. Value functions are plotted over two dimensions 
of the state, xt and y1,t, holding y2,t fixed at an intermediate level.
Figure 1.  Value Function
 The value function is increasing in xt and y1,t as larger stock and/or quota cannot reduce 
MPE profits. Notice that the value at all combinations of (xt , y1,t) declines throughout the 
fishing season as t increases. Holding a large amount of quota in the terminal period yields 
lower value under a decreasing returns to size technology. Marginal harvesting profits even-
tually decline to zero; therefore a threshold quota amount exists at which the marginal value 
of additional quota is zero. This threshold quantity is smaller later in the fishing season.
 Figure 2 reports the period 1, fisherman 1 value function, again net of quota purchase 
costs, over the range of feasible quota holdings; the stock size is held fixed. The effects of 
stock externalities are small but clear. The value that fisherman 1 places on quota declines 
with the quota held by a rival fisherman, since when fisherman 2 is quota constrained, 
fisherman 1 can earn more profit from a given amount of quota and stock.
 We now turn to results for some important cases of our general model. The results 
we present illustrate insights that may not be transparent without direct observation of 
MPE harvest behavior. We present additional results in Appendix B over a wider range 
of parameter values.
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 Table 1 reports MPE equilibrium harvests, stock size, and profits, both by period and 
for the full season. First-best outcomes are reported as a benchmark to assess economic 
performance under ITQ management.10 Harvest quantities are reported as percentages of 
the seasonal quota. Stock sizes are reported as the percentage of the stock carrying capac-
ity. Columns under the Performance heading report the percentage harvest obtained under 
the MPE of the ITQ fishing game, relative to the first-best harvest. The final column, la-
beled Vne/V*, reports the percentage rent attained under the MPE equilibrium relative to 
the first-best rent.
 Case 1.1 of table 1 assumes a heterogeneous in-value fish stock with stock effect 
parameter β = 1 and no within-season growth r = 0. There are no congestion effects, and 
fishermen are symmetric. Case 1 mirrors the conditions in Clark (1980a) and Boyce (1992), 
with the exception of the missing congestion, which is considered separately below.
 Case 1.1 results indicate MPE harvests are symmetric across fishermen. Both MPE 
and first-best harvests decline throughout the season. Under our cost specification, mar-
ginal costs increase as the stock size is reduced; i.e., ∂2c(.)/∂h∂x < 0. Harvesting more fish 
early in the season, when the stock size is larger, lowers seasonal costs.11 
 MPE harvest patterns verify that, relative to first-best outcomes, a race to fish and 
rent dissipation occur under ITQs when stock-value is heterogeneous. In period 1, the 
Figure 2.  Value Function
10 Our model can be used to study under alternative management regimes. We derive MPE harvest and profits 
in a fishery that is managed under a common quota, or total allowable catch policy, and under open access. Ad-
ditional results are reported in Appendix C.
11 While our assumptions for the cross-derivative effect seems reasonable, empirical evidence for second-order 
properties of resource extraction costs is scarce.
Markov-Perfect Rent Dissipation in Rights-Based Fisheries    123
combined harvest is 109.6% of the first-best harvest, whereas in period 4, the MPE har-
vest is 84.6% of the first-best harvest. The race to fish occurs because marginal profit 
associated with each unit of harvest falls as the stock size declines. With no growth, the 
stock size is reduced from 50% of carrying capacity to 30%, the difference being the total 
allowable catch that is extracted during the season. Non-cooperating fishermen increase 
per-period harvest and extract their quota units at a higher unit cost in order to benefit 
from the stock effect (Clark 1980a). Relative to the first best, this strategy raises period 
profits early in the season and lowers profits late in the season. The results find that total 
seasonal profit is lower in the ITQ fishery, as expected, at 99.6% of first-best rent.
Table 1
Heterogeneous-in-value Fish Stock
Case 1.1: Heterogeneous Stock
                                        ITQ game                         First Best              Performance
Period                    h1       h2        x              h1            h2              x          hne/h*       Vne/V*
1 15.0 15.0 50.0 13.7 13.7 50.0 109.6 105.0
2 13.5 13.5 44.0 12.9 12.9 44.5 104.7 101.7
3 11.9 11.9 38.6 12.1 12.1 39.4 98.5 98.3
4 9.6 9.6 33.8 11.3 11.3 34.5 84.6 91.2
Total 50.0 50.0 30.0 50.0 50.0 30.0 100.0 99.6
Case 1.2: Heterogeneous Stock, Congestion Effects
                                        ITQ game                         First Best              Performance
Period                    h1       h2        x              h1            h2              x          hne/h*       Vne/V*
1 14.6 14.6 50.0 13.7 13.7 50.0 106.9 102.7
2 13.1 13.1 44.2 12.9 12.9 44.5 101.5 100.0
3 11.6 11.6 38.9 12.1 12.1 39.4 95.8 97.8
4 10.7 10.7 34.3 11.3 11.3 34.5 94.6 98.1
Total 50.0 50.0 30.0 50.0 50.0 30.0 100.0 99.9
Case 1.3: Heterogenous Stock, Per-period Capital Costs
                                        ITQ game                         First Best              Performance
Period                    h1       h2        x              h1            h2              x          hne/h*       Vne/V*
1 16.7 16.9 50.0 15.6 15.6 50.0 107.8 106.4
2 14.4 13.7 43.3 14.6 14.6 43.8 96.6 95.5
3 13.8 11.0 37.7 13.5 13.5 37.9 91.7 89.1
4 13.5 0.0 32.7 12.7 0.0 32.5 106.1 105.5
Total 58.4 41.6 30.0 56.4 43.6 30.0 100.0 99.0
 Case 1.2 in table 1 maintains the assumption of a heterogeneous in-value fish stock 
and symmetric fishermen, but adds congestion costs. We set γ = 1, which effectively raises 
the marginal harvesting cost for both fishermen. Comparing MPE harvest patterns to the 
no-congestion results of Case 1, we see that raising costs has the effect of slowing the race 
to fish. This finding is intuitive if we examine the incentive to race. ITQ fishermen prefer 
to extract their quota early to benefit from stock effect implicit in the harvest technology. 
However, beating rival fishermen to the highest value units comes at a higher marginal 
cost which, all else equal, lowers unit profits. Note also that the terminal period stock size 
cannot fall below the escapement level, x1 – y, and therefore, residual profit per unit of 
Valcu and Weninger124
quota, presumably at a slower fishing pace later in the season, is bounded below. We see 
that congestion costs make it more costly to race; thus the incentive to do so is diminished.
 Case 1.3 in table 1 maintains the assumption of a heterogeneous in value fish stock 
and symmetric fishermen. We introduce a per-period cost of remaining active in the ITQ 
fishery. For example, fishermen are often able to switch fisheries mid-season to harvest dif-
ferent species, oftentimes with different gear. Case 1.3 results assume that seasonal fixed 
cost is proportional to the time the vessel is active in the ITQ fishery. Fishermen therefore 
face a per-period cost of participating in the ITQ fishery, rather than a seasonal cost.
 The results indicate asymmetric MPE harvest policies, even though fishermen are 
otherwise identical. Fisherman 1 harvests during all production periods and harvests more 
fish per period (with the exception of period 1) than his counterpart. Fisherman 2 harvests 
in the first three periods only. There are, of course, two equilibria; a second asymmetric 
equilibrium exists where the fishermen exchange roles. The first-best harvest policy fol-
lows a similar pattern, although when both fishermen are active they share the per-period 
harvest equally under the first-best. The entire total allowable catch is extracted in both 
cases. Rents under the MPE are 99.0% of the first-best rent.
 A per-period capital cost provides an incentive to concentrate harvesting activity into 
fewer periods; i.e., by increasing the harvest rate, fishing is completed early, which saves 
the per-period fixed cost. This can be seen by comparing MPE harvest patterns in Case 1 
of the table, where period fixed costs are absent.
 Summarizing the results in table 1, we find that the general insights of Clark (1980a) 
and Boyce (1992) are confirmed; in the presence of a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, 
non-cooperating ITQ fishermen have incentive to engage in a costly race to fish. Extract-
ing quota before rival fishermen lowers unit harvest cost and increases the residual profit 
to each quota unit. This behavior raises costs above the minimum required to extract the 
total quota, and thus dissipates rents in the ITQ fishery. We find that adding congestion 
effects improves the rent outcomes by raising the cost of competition for higher-valued 
units of the stock. lastly, the results show that patterns of accelerated harvest early in a 
fishing season when stock size is high may be optimal, depending on the structure of the 
harvest technology and the opportunity cost of remaining active.
 Case 2.1 in table 2 introduces within-season stock growth (Bisack and Sutinen 2006). 
We consider a case of symmetric fishermen and no congestion effects. The growth rate is 
chosen such that the first-best escapement at the end of the fishing season is equal to 
beginning season stock size (r = .202). The scenario is intended to represent a stock that 
grows continuously and a fishery managed under a sustainable harvest policy.
 The results show, not surprisingly, that within-season stock growth slows the race to 
fish. The explanation is simple: growth replenishes the stock before subsequent period har-
vesting begins. Within-season growth creates temporally homogeneous stock abundance 
and restores the conditions under which ITQs are known to generate first-best outcomes.
 Case 2.2 in table 2 introduces payoff interaction on the revenue side; the demand for 
fish is assumed to be finitely elastic. The parameters of the linear fish demand function are 
set such that a demand elasticity of –5 results when the total allowable catch is spread even-
ly across harvest periods. Case 2.2 assumes identical fishermen and no congestion effects.
 The downward sloping demand introduces an incentive to distribute the harvest 
evenly throughout the season. This slows the rate of harvest relative to the case of a 
perfectly elastic fish demand. Notice that there are no revenue-side market distortions in 
Case 2.2, as the entire seasonal quota is harvested. The strategy of holding back quota to 
maintain high fish prices will raise profits only if the residual demand facing an individual 
fishermen is inelastic. Additional results (not reported here) show that market power dis-
tortions can arise in an MPE if the demand for fish is sufficiently inelastic. For example, 
at a demand elasticity of –0.5, we find seasonal MPE less than the total allowable catch.
 It should be noted that price effects alone do not cause rent dissipation in our model 
when we solve for MPE harvest behavior with the stock elasticity parameter set to zero. 
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For these cases, the MPE outcomes matched first-best outcomes for various demand elas-
ticities and over a range of other parameter values (see Appendix B). Costello and deacon 
(2007) suggest rent dissipation can occur in an ITQ-managed fishery in the absence of 
stock externalities and congestion effects. We consider scenarios where the price of fish 
changes exogenously throughout the season. In these cases, MPE harvest rates respond 
to seasonal price changes in obvious ways. However, in the absence of stock effects, rent 
dissipation does not occur. If stock effects are absent, nothing is gained by fishing when 
the stock size is large or small. In fact, there is no strategic interaction in the model when 
β = 0. When prices are high, fishermen optimally trade off the gains of harvesting with 
the cost savings from spreading the catch evenly throughout the season. MPE harvests 
and rents mirror first-best outcomes.
 Case 2.3 in table 2 assumes no within-season stock growth or congestion effects and 
homogeneous fishermen. We assume the stock effect varies throughout the season to approxi-
mate naturally varying stock conditions (Costello and deacon 2007). For example, salmon 
concentrate in bays at the mouths of streams prior to swimming upstream to spawn. We model 
heterogeneous stock concentrations by allowing the stock elasticity parameter to vary across 
periods. In Case 2.3, the stock elasticity parameter β = 0.9, 0.95, 1, 1.1 in periods 1–4.
 Results show that MPE harvests increase early in the season due to the higher stock 
size. The results, while not surprising, demonstrate how biological forces alter temporal 
harvest patterns in ITQ fisheries. Separating these effects from rent seeking behavior by 
fishermen is likely to be difficult in practice, particularly if temporal movements of fish 
stocks are not fully known.
Table 2
Stock growth, Price, and Cost Effects
Case 2.1: Within-season Stock growth
 ITQ game                         First Best              Performance
Period                    h1       h2        x              h1            h2              x          hne/h*       Vne/V*
1 12.2 12.2 50.0 11.5 11.5 50.0 106.6 104.2
2 12.4 12.4 50.1 12.2 12.2 50.4 101.9 101.0
3 12.6 12.6 50.1 12.8 12.8 50.6 98.4 98.7
4 12.7 12.7 50.2 13.5 13.5 50.4 94.2 96.2
Total 50.0 50.0  50.0 50.0  100.0 99.9
Case 2.2: Elastic demand
 ITQ game                         First Best              Performance
Period                    h1       h2        x              h1            h2              x          hne/h*       Vne/V*
1 14.0 14.0 50.0 13.2 13.2 50.0 106.3 101.5
2 13.1 13.1 44.4 12.8 12.8 44.7 102.4 100.2
3 12.0 12.0 39.2 12.3 12.3 39.6 97.3 98.9
4 10.9 10.9 34.4 11.8 11.8 34.7 93.0 98.3
Total 50.0 50.0  50.0 50.0  100.0 99.8
Case 2.3: Varying Stock Elasticity
 ITQ game                         First Best               Performance
Period                    h1       h2        x              h1            h2              x          hne/h*       Vne/V*
1 15.8 15.8 50.0 14.5 14.5 50.0 108.8 104.7
2 13.5 13.5 43.7 13.2 13.2 44.2 102.7 100.8
3 11.3 11.3 38.3 11.8 11.8 38.9 96.1 97.2
4 9.3 9.3 33.7 10.5 10.5 34.2 88.9 93.8
Total 50.0 50.0  50.0 50.0  100.0 99.8
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Stochastic Stock Evolution
Table 3 reports results for a fish stock that evolves stochastically. Case 3.1 assumes no 
within-season stock growth, symmetric fishermen, and no congestion. The one-period-
ahead stock size is subject to multiplicative shock, which take values ξ = 0.85, 1, and 
1.15 with equal probability.12
 Case 3.1 results are similar to the deterministic model studied above, with a few 
exceptions. A race to fish and rent dissipation occur in the ITQ fishing game. Expected 
harvests under ITQs and the first-best policy are both less than the total allowable catch. 
Net fishing profits are concave in stock size. Stock uncertainty lowers expected net prof-
its, by Jensen’s inequality, and lowers expected harvest. Notice that expected seasonal 
harvests in the ITQ game are slightly larger (100.7%) than first-best harvest. The race to 
fish caused by the stock externality increases MPE harvests early in the season. Under 
Case 3.1 parameters, the higher MPE early on more than offsets the lower harvests in 
later periods. The decline in expected harvest is explained by poor growing conditions 
throughout the season; i.e., with positive probability, a series of low growth shocks are re-
alized in which case extracting the entire quota is not profitable. We examined additional 
cases where harvesting is more profitable; e.g., within-season growth, lower harvest costs, 
and smaller stock effects and found that MPE outcomes involve harvesting all available 
quota (these results are not reported to conserve space).
 Case 3.2 assumes within-season stock growth (r = 0.1). Relative to the no-growth 
case, within-season stock growth results in lower expected harvests early in the season 
and higher harvests later in the season. Under stochastic stock conditions, harvest quota 
can be viewed as an option to be exercised at any time during the fishing season. If the 
fish stock grows during the season, the return from exercising the option later can be 
higher. As the season progresses, however, exercising the option later risks the possibil-
ity of a low growth shock and low quota return. Notice that under within-season growth, 
the sum of expected harvests falls only slightly below the aggregate quota. Stock growth 
counters the effects of low growth shocks, leading fishermen to harvest a larger share of 
the total quota than under the no-growth case, 3.1.
 Our Case 3.3 (table 3) reports the findings of a policy experiment. We simulate the 
effect of a finer delineation of harvest rights. In the experiment, the fishery manager is-
sues temporally delineated rights with the total allowable catch split evenly between the 
first and second half of the harvest season.13 Case 3.3 assumes no congestion, a constant 
fish price, and symmetric fishermen.
 To isolate the effect of the temporal delineation, Case 3.3 compares MPE harvest 
policies with and without the temporal rights delineation in place. hne,c and Vne,c denote, 
respectively, the MPE harvest and profit under the temporal quota constraint. Not sur-
prisingly, the results show that temporal delineation slows the race to fish, relative to the 
unconstrained case. We also see that the under temporally delineated rights, fishermen 
harvest less, hne,c/hne = 99.3%, and earn lower seasonal profit, Vne,c/Vne = 99.9%, than 
when quota is temporally unconstrained. Temporal delineation limits the ability of fisher-
men to respond to unanticipated growth shocks throughout the fishing season. The result 
is reduced harvest and lower economic rent in the fishery.
12 Stock uncertainty is common to all identical fishermen; therefore no within-season quota trading takes place. 
If uncertainty was fishermen-specific, quota trades based on pre-season expectations could become ex-post sub-
optimal, providing incentives for further trade. An analysis of within-season quota trading is left for future work.
13 Costello and Deacon (2007) suggest that redundant and costly searches for spatially dispersed fish stocks 
could be reduced by allocating spatially delineated harvest rights. We do not incorporate space or seach costs in 
our model and, therefore, cannot examine the performance of spatially delineated rights. Salmon bycatch per-
mits issued for the Bering Sea pollock fishery are delineated bi-seasonally (NMFS 2010).
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Further Results
We solved for MPE harvest policies and rent outcomes for the case of three fishermen and 
under a range of stock growth and demand conditions with and without stock and congestion 
effects. The results are qualitatively similar to the two fisherman results. We present a subset 
of our findings in Appendix B. There is one quantitative difference worth pointing out when 
moving from two to three active fishermen. Relative to first-best outcomes, we find smaller 
rent losses under the MPE harvest policies when N = 3. Recall that rent is dissipated in our 
model when fishermen increase per-period harvest, which causes marginal costs to rise 
under a diminishing returns technology; i.e, a strictly convex cost function. When the total 
quota is spread across three fishermen, racing for fish continues to increase marginal costs, 
but to a lesser extent, since there is less variation in marginal costs at lower per-fishermen 
harvest levels. The implication is that rent losses due to unattended production externalities 
in decentralized ITQ fisheries will decline with the number of active fishermen.
 We thoroughly examined the role of congestion externalities in our model under a host 
of biological, technological, and market conditions. Two key findings emerge. First, introduc-
ing congestion externalities to the model quantitatively affects MPE harvesting patterns but 
does not change our general findings. Congestion and stock effects are non-separable in our 
harvest technology; therefore including both effects alters but does not remove the incentive 
to race to fish. We find that the combined effect of congestion and stock effects is ambiguous. 
Congestion may increase the costs of racing to fish and counter the rent-seeking motive.
Table 3 
Stochastic Stock growth and Enhanced Rights
Case 3.1: Stock Uncertainty, No Stock growth
 ITQ game                         First Best              Performance
Period                    h1       h2        x              h1            h2              x          hne/h*       Vne/V*
1 14.9 14.9 50.0 14.1 14.1 50.0 106.0 102.8
2 13.1 13.1 44.1 12.8 12.8 44.4 102.8 100.6
3 11.6 11.6 38.8 11.8 11.8 39.3 98.7 98.3
4 10.1 10.1 34.2 10.8 10.8 34.6 93.4 96.2
Total 49.7 49.7  49.3 49.3  100.7 99.8
Case 3.2: Stock Uncertainty, Within-season Stock growth
 ITQ game                         First Best              Performance
Period                    h1       h2        x              h1            h2              x          hne/h*       Vne/V*
1 13.6 13.6 50.0 13.0 13.0 50.0 104.5 102.4
2 12.8 12.8 47.0 12.6 12.6 47.2 101.8 100.5
3 12.1 12.1 44.2 12.3 12.3 44.6 98.9 98.9
4 11.4 11.4 41.7 11.9 11.9 42.0 95.3 97.3
Total 49.9 49.9  49.8 49.8  100.2 99.9
Case 3.3: Temporally-delineated ITQs
                             Time-delineated ITQs                   Standard ITQs               Performance
Period                    h1       h2        x              h1            h2              x         hne,c/hne    Vne,c/Vne
1 13.3 13.3 50.0 14.9 14.9 50.0 89.2 94.0
2 11.7 11.7 44.7 13.1 13.1 44.0 89.4 94.0
3 12.9 12.9 40.0 11.6 11.6 38.8 111.2 107.1
4 11.4 11.4 34.8 10.1 10.1 34.2 113.4 107.2
Total 49.3 49.3  49.7 49.7  99.3 99.9
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 A second result, which holds over all model parameterizations we examined (see Ap-
pendix B) is that congestion effects alone do not cause rent to be dissipated. This result 
supports the analysis of danielsson (2000) and can be understood as follows. Congestion 
effects influence the harvest productivity and the costs of all active fishermen. As shown 
in the derivation of equation (8), these effects are internalized under a binding quota con-
straint. A fishermen whose actions lower the productivity of others will bear the cost of 
this action because the price of all quota, including his own, will be reduced. Congestion 
costs can be lowered by removing active fishermen from the fishing ground. However, 
removing fisherman i during period t implies , 0,
ne
i th    which in a quota-managed fish-
ery and assuming the quota binds, alters the valuation of quota for all active fishermen. 
Adding and removing fishermen from the fishing grounds thus affects each fisherman’s 
valuation of quota and is fully captured in the quota trading market (danielsson 2000).
Conclusion
We have used numerical collocation to identify MPE equilibrium harvesting behavior in a 
dynamic fishing game. Our approach allows direct examination of MPE harvest patterns 
and rent dissipation outcomes in a general model of an ITQ-managed fishery. Our find-
ings refine earlier insight regarding unattended production externalities in ITQ fisheries 
and offer new insights for the design of quota management programs.
 We find that conditions can exist in which rights-based management programs do not 
replicate first-best economic outcomes. A race to fish by non-cooperating fishermen can 
persist under decentralized ITQ management when the fish stock is heterogeneous in size 
and the harvest technology exhibits stock effects. When these conditions hold, fishermen 
will find it privately optimal to increase harvest rates to extract quota units before rival 
fishermen deplete the stock. Rents are dissipated under diminishing returns technology as 
unit costs increase above the minimum required to harvest the quota.
 Overall, we find that rent dissipation occurs under fairly special technological and bi-
ological conditions. The harvest technology must exhibit decreasing returns. Stock effects 
must be large enough to induce cost-inefficient competition for the highest-valued units 
of the stock. Within season changes in the stock size or value must be significant enough 
to induce inefficient production.
 We show that accelerated harvest early in a fishing season is not a sufficient con-
dition for rent dissipation; e.g., fishermen may speed harvest to exploit available cost 
economies, save on capital costs, or respond to exogenous changes in prices and stock 
conditions. Our results find that congestion effects alone do not cause rent dissipation in 
ITQ-managed fisheries, a result noted in Danielsson (2000). All else equal, congestion ef-
fects slow the race to fish for the highest-valued units of a heterogenous fish stock. This 
result is supported empirically in Huang and Smith (2010).
 Our results find that rent dissipation in ITQ fisheries will not arise due to price com-
petition alone. Elastic demand provides incentives to smooth the harvest throughout the 
fishing season, and all else being equal, will slow a race to fish. Rent loss due to market 
power can occur if fishermen reduce their harvest to maintain high prices at the dock. 
However, this strategy raises profits only under sufficiently inelastic fish demand.
 A question we do not resolve in this article is whether some form of enhanced prop-
erty rights; e.g., time- or spatially delineated rights, will be required to secure the full 
economic benefits promised by rights-based fisheries management programs. A stochastic 
policy simulation is presented to demonstrate the potential negative effects of imposing 
constraints in the form of temporally delineated fishing rights. We do not incorporate 
spatial competition in our model, but have reason to suspect similar problems would arise 
if quota is spatially delineated. If regulations prohibit fishermen from responding to un-
anticipated movements of fish stocks over time and across space, rents can be dissipated. 
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Our results suggest the benefits from fully delineating fishing rights is an empirical ques-
tion that will depend on the characteristics of the fishery under consideration. Managers 
should assess, and if possible, empirically measure stock effects, returns to size, and 
within-season stock declines, to determine if rent dissipation is likely to be significant 
under a standard ITQ design. Managers should also consider alternate motives to race to 
fish before labeling accelerated harvest patterns as evidence of rent dissipation.
 Enhanced property rights are likely to be information intensive, adding to administra-
tive and monitoring costs. Alternatively, managers may wish to consider the potential for 
fishermen to devise their own solutions to the problem of unattended externalities in ITQ 
fisheries.14 Program designs with low transactions costs; i.e., minimal restrictions on quo-
ta trading and ownership, and long-term security may allow fishermen to coordinate their 
activities and correct the effects of unattended externalities (Coase 1960). Externalities 
create problems when fishermen cannot coordinate their actions. ITQ programs that place 
limits on quota trading and ownership may prevent such coordination and may increase 
problems related to unattended externalities.
 As demonstrated, numerical methods offer a powerful tool to study economic be-
havior and the impacts of regulation in complex settings. These methods can be extended 
to consider additional sources of uncertainty; e.g., price and cost uncertainty and games 
with many players (e.g., Farias, Saure, and Weintraub 2008), and can provide a basis for 
econometric estimation of strategic interactions among competing fishermen (see Bajari, 
Benkard, and levin 2007). Such extensions could provide further insights to improve 
rights-based management programs in fisheries and other natural resources.
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